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On the estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we reconsider the formal estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries. Risk is 
modeled as the variability of the profit function of a representative intermediary, here a bank, as 
formally considered in finance theory. In turn, banking theory suggests that risk is determined 
simultaneously with profits and other bank- and industry-level characteristics that cannot be 
considered predetermined when profit-maximizing decisions of financial institutions are to be 
made. Thus, risk is endogenous. We estimate the new model on a panel of US banks, spanning 
the period 1985q1-2010q2. The findings suggest that risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and 
accelerated quickly thereafter and up to 2007. We also establish that the risk of the failed banks is 
quite higher than the industry’s average and this risk peaks one to two-years before the default 
date. Indices of bank risk commonly used in the literature do not capture these trends and/ or the 
scale of the increase in bank risk. Thus, we provide a new leading indicator, which is able to 
forecast future solvency problems in the banking industry.  
 
Keywords: Estimation of risk, financial institutions, banks, endogenous risk, US banking sector 
JEL classification: C13, C33, E47, G21, G32 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 turned the spotlight on financial institutions and their 
management of the risks they face. A fundamental and timely question is how the risk of a financial 
intermediary should be measured and the crisis showed that existing measures of the risk of financial 
institutions are inaccurate and with limited forecasting ability. In this paper, we propose a new method to 
estimate intermediation risk, using the profit function and the implications of standard economic and 
banking theory. An important element in our framework is that risk is allowed to be endogenous to 
internal factors, such as managerial decisions, and external factors, such as the macroeconomic 
environment. This novelty is essential because existing measures, such as accounting ratios and market 
rates, cannot capture this type of simultaneity. 
Building on economic theory, we use the implications of the portfolio selection models, primarily 
developed to estimate optimal portfolios by Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952), and extended by many 
others. In this class of models the estimates of the simple variance of profits, or the downside variance, 
can be used to measure risk. In particular, this theory suggests that if an overall measure of risk is sought 
in the context of expected utility, that measure should be related to the variability of profits or the 
variability of factors determining the profit function. In this literature, such measures are employed 
primarily to model asset prices and portfolio value. Here, we use the profit function to describe the 
technology of financial institutions in the context of duality theory.  
We augment our framework with the implications of intermediation (banking) theory, which 
suggests that risk decisions of financial intermediaries are simultaneously made with perceptions on 
expected profits and, in addition, are affected by certain characteristics of a bank’s balance sheet and the 
state of the economic environment.1 To motivate this, consider two banks with the same initial risk levels 
but different levels of capitalization or liquidity. Now if e.g. an exogenous or systemic shock hits the 
banking sector, the more liquid or capitalized bank will be able to buffer risk more easily, while the less 
                                               
1 This is recognized by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Dangl and Zechner (2004), Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), Flannery and Rangan (2008), Freixas and Rochet (2008), Degryse et al. (2009), among many 
others. 
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liquid or less-capitalized bank will have to re-determine its risky position to a greater extent. Naturally, in 
the following period the level of risk (i.e., the volatility of profits) of the two banks will be quite different. 
This simultaneity calls for a new model, where risk is jointly determined along with (i) other decisions of 
the financial institutions (e.g., concerning their level of capitalization and/ or liquidity) and (ii) the 
macroeconomic environment. In other words, the variability of profits should be endogenous to profits 
themselves and potentially to other bank-level variables or the structural and macroeconomic conditions. 
Thus, an important advantage of the approach presented here is that technology, risk, bank decisions and 
structural and macroeconomic conditions can be modeled simultaneously.  
 The new method is quite general and can, in fact, be applied to any firm. Here, we focus on 
financial institutions and, in particular banks, because of the clear implications of banking theory 
concerning the endogeneity discussed above, the important developments in the banking sector before and 
after the subprime crisis and the key role banks play in the managerial, the real and the monetary 
economic spectrum. One important concern for our modeling choice is not to impose more stringent data 
requirements on the researcher than the usual bank-level data required for the estimation of the profit 
function of banks.     
The model is applied to the full panel of US banks that covers the period 1985q1-2010q2. The 
choice of the US banking sector allows an examination of the time path of bank risk that led to the 
banking crisis of the late 2000s. The results indicate that bank risk was relatively stable up to 2001 and 
gradually increased by more than 200%, since then. This pattern is robust, irrespective of the functional 
form used to estimate the profit function and the variables included to tackle simultaneity. Thus, the new 
measure captures the buildup of bank risk way before the eruption of the financial turmoil in 2007, and 
this finding is in line with perceptions about the rising of bank risk for a number of years before the crisis 
erupted. In this respect, and besides the important fact that the new method has a clear theoretical basis, 
this method represents a better alternative compared to measures widely employed in banking studies to 
measure risk. In fact, we do show that existing measures of bank risk, that are widely employed in 
empirical studies, do not seem to capture the buildup of risk during the 2000s and/ or its substantial 
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increase. Finally, as a robustness check, we demonstrate that our measure predicts the higher risk of banks 
that became insolvent during our sample period relative to the industry’s average. Given the above, our 
measure of bank risk is qualified as a new measure for the probability of default and a leading indicator to 
forecast solvency problems in the banking sector.     
As accounting- and market-based measures failed to forecast the financial crisis of 2007, a few 
recent studies have placed significant effort in revisiting the estimation of bank risk and naturally they 
relate to our work in a direct way. Most notably, studies like Ioannidou et al. (2009) and Knaup and 
Wagner (2009) use market- or accounting-based data to evaluate risk. We view these efforts as 
complementary to ours for two reasons. First, these efforts pose more stringent micro-level data 
requirements on the researcher or require banks to be listed in the stock market. Second, as an extension 
to our study, these measures can be compared to ours to show whether findings converge, so that a better 
measure of total bank risk can be put forth. In a nutshell, we view these developments in the measurement 
of bank risk as a significant way to shed some light in this rather neglected modeling issue. 
Our study is also related to a big literature on financial stability. For example, Aspachs et al. 
(2007), within a general equilibrium framework, propose a measure of financial fragility that is based on 
economic welfare. Also, the set of financial soundness indicators introduced by the IMF in 2006 reflect 
another step towards a globally accepted measure of financial stability. A number of other indicators are 
built in empirical studies of financial crises like in Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999), Elsinger et al. (2006) 
and Giesecke and Kim (2011). A common feature of these studies is that the indicators sought reflect an 
aggregate measure of financial stability that incorporates indirect elements of bank risk.   
The rest of the paper proceeds along the following lines. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
estimation of bank risk, discusses the limitations and shows how the measures usually found in this 
literature evolve over time in the US banking sector. Section 3 presents the formal econometric model 
that underlines our new method. Section 4 discusses the application of the new method to the US banking 
sector and presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
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2. Theoretical considerations and empirical facts 
2.1. Existing measures of bank risk 
It is well-known that the risk of financial institutions (here we refer to banks for simplicity) comes in 
many types. For example, it takes the form of credit, liquidity, interest-rate, solvency and operational risk. 
Banks assume all types of risk to make profits. Yet, a bank that undertakes too much risk of any type can 
become insolvent and fail. For example, high credit and liquidity risks typically manifest themselves 
through mismatched maturities and durations between assets and liabilities. Also, high operational risk 
appears when costs are significantly related to bank output. Banks ultimately fail because they cannot 
generate liquid assets to meet deposit withdrawals, and they operate with insufficient capital to absorb 
losses if they were forced to liquidate assets. Therefore, a measure of overall bank risk should encompass 
the features of the various bank risks in one box. For various reasons this box remains somewhat black in 
the bank-risk literature. In this section, we discuss the theoretical underpinnings of several measures of 
risk currently used by researchers and regulators.  
Harry Markowitz (1952) was among the first to note that risk of asset portfolios can be captured 
from the variance of profits. His approach triggered a big literature on the so-called “portfolio selection 
theory” and led to the models currently described as Value at Risk (VaR). The purpose of this section is 
not to review this literature that is related primarily to asset portfolio risk (a recent review of such models 
can be found in Cochrane, 2007), but rather to demonstrate the relationship of bank risk with standard 
finance and banking theory. Notably, the financial intermediation literature has largely ignored the 
implications of these theories for the measurement of bank risk. Mitchell (1982) is, to our knowledge, the 
first and one of the very few studies that formally use a profit function and its variance as a metric of the 
risk of a banking firm. In theoretical derivations, he notes that the most valuable risk metric of a bank is 
the variance of the returns or the variance of the returns scaled by their mean. In a companion paper, 
Mitchell (1986) again uses these risk measures to examine theoretically the relationship between bank 
risk and regulations. However, estimation of such a metric of risk is, to our knowledge, absent in the 
literature. So what measures of bank risk are currently being used in empirical banking studies?  
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For a bank to report higher returns than its peers it must manage the various risks in a better way, 
or realize market power and other cost advantages compared to its competitors. Aggregate bank 
profitability is usually measured in terms of the return on assets (ROA = profits/ total assets) or the return 
on equity (ROE = profits/ total equity). The difference between the two is the so-called equity multiplier 
(EM = total assets/ total equity), which is the inverse of the basic equity capital ratio. EM (or its inverse) 
represents a risk measure because it shows how many assets can go into default before a bank becomes 
insolvent. However, this simple risk measure is problematic in various ways, among which three are the 
most important. First and foremost, simple accounting ratios do not incorporate expectations concerning 
the perceived probability of insolvency. In banking markets, probably more intensely than in other 
sectors, forward-looking expectations are highly important in shaping investors’ behavior, depositors’ 
confidence and market ratings. A simple accounting ratio fails to account for these expectations as it 
represents a “static photograph” of a bank’s financial account at a specific point in time. Second, it is 
well-known from the portfolio theory that risk is essentially about variability, and more specifically about 
profit variability. Simple accounting ratios that do not capture variability will fail to highlight the 
dynamic nature of risk and, therefore, they probably underestimate the risk of insolvency. Finally, under 
the impulse of the Basel guidelines, capital is heavily regulated, which is a fact that may significantly 
reduce the importance of the EM ratio as a bank risk proxy. 
Other accounting-based ratios used to measure bank risk are related to credit and/or liquidity risk, 
and mainly include the ratio of (i) non-performing loans to total loans, (ii) loan-loss provisions to total 
loans, (iii) risk-weighted assets to total assets (regulatory measure) or similar. These measures could ex-
post be informative about how risk evolves over time. Yet, besides bearing the significant disadvantages 
of using accounting data on stock variables to proxy a dynamic element such as risk, these measures do 
not seem to provide a good ex ante measure of bank risk. Rather, they proxy different aspects of bank risk 
at a specific point in time and this information comes ex post.  
An interesting extension to simple accounting ratios has been put forth by Hannan and Hanweck 
(1988) and Boyd and Runkle (1993), who elaborate on Roy (1952) for the representative bank. These 
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studies represent the first effort to measure the perceived probability of insolvency for each bank in their 
sample, thus incorporating expectations and variability into their measures. Since insolvency is presumed 
to occur when current bank losses exhaust capital, estimates of the likelihood of insolvency may be 
obtained by noting that this likelihood is equivalent to the probability that ROA < -EA, where ROA is as 
above and EA = 1/ EM. Then, [E(ROA) + EA]/ σ(ROA) represents the number of standard deviations 
between the expected value of bank profitability, ROA, and that negative values of ROA = -EA that 
would yield insolvency. Boyd and Rankle (1993) named this estimate of bank risk “Z-score” or “Z-
index”. The Z-score has been widely used ever since in many empirical studies as a proxy for total bank 
risk and one may suggest that it has recently become the industry standard, especially when widely 
available sources of bank data are employed (see e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2008; Boyd et al., 2006).  
The problem with the Z-score is the calculation of the component of the variance of the returns on 
assets, σ(ROA). In the above literature, σ(ROA) is derived by using information on ROA from 3 to 5 
years in the past. We feel that there are at least three serious problems with this approach. First, this 
procedure does not provide information on the variance component at time t and, thus, does not capture 
the short-term nature of bank risk. This is especially true when only annual data is available to the 
researcher, which is often the case with bank-level data. Therefore, and given the notorious short-term 
fluctuations of bank risk, it is important that we have a measure that captures the actual short-term 
fluctuations in bank profits and not the fluctuations encompassing information from three years before or 
more. Second, the Z-score incorporates elements of credit and operational risk, but tells as little 
concerning liquidity risk, as it does not provide information on the structure of bank assets. Yet, when 
crises hit the banking sector, the first thing banks do is to secure their liquidity position, which tends to 
erode very quickly especially if the crisis is deep enough to cause runs. Finally, by using information 
from 3 to 5 time periods before t, the Z-score decreases the time dimension of the panels. In banking 
studies, where the time dimension of the panels is usually around 8-10 years, this reduction has important 
implications for the robustness of the empirical results.  
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A measure of risk that is quite different in nature involves bank ratings from rating agencies (see 
e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008) and, more appealingly, the disagreement between the major rating 
agencies (see Morgan, 2002). Rating agencies provide a probability of default, or a similar measure of the 
ability of a bank to meet its obligations to depositors and other creditors. Thus, ratings may be superior to 
indicators that use only balance-sheet variables to proxy risk. However, agency ratings have been recently 
heavily criticized on their ability to estimate and forecast bank risk, especially in the dawn of the global 
financial crisis (see Felton and Reinhart, 2008). Moreover, relatively small banks that do not trade in the 
stock market and banks from low-income countries are generally not rated. This poses a heavy data 
constraint on studies of emerging markets. 
Given the problems associated with the above methods, a few very recent studies have come up 
with new ideas to measure bank risk. Ioannidou et al. (2009) and Jimenez et al. (2009) use ideas 
stemming from probability of default, VaR and duration methods and analyze the time to default of an 
individual loan as a measure of its risk. On the one hand, this duration model has the advantage of 
providing more accurate information at the very micro level about how risky an individual bank loan is. 
On the other hand, the method requires market data on individual loans that are not widely available. 
Another interesting study is that of Knaup and Wagner (2009). Using information impounded in bank 
share prices and by exploiting differences in their sensitivity to credit default swap (CDS) spreads of 
borrowers of varying quality, this paper provides a clever new method to proxy credit risk. Note that even 
though this method has several attractive elements, again the focus is on credit risk and an inherent 
assumption is that the market for CDS is fully efficient. Also, this method allows evaluation of market 
risk only for listed banks. 
On the basis of the above considerations, it is fairly obvious that more research is needed to 
estimate bank risk in a parsimonious way. An important common element missing from all the studies 
discussed above is that bank risk is endogenously determined with managerial decisions concerning other 
important characteristics of bank balance sheets and is also affected by the macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment. We view this limitation as very important. Before we build a new econometric model of 
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endogenous bank risk, we turn to some stylized facts that show how most of the various existing 
measures of bank risk discussed here evolve over the period 1985-2010 in the US banking sector.                
 
2.2. Data, stylized facts and measurement of risk with existing techniques 
In this section we use bank-level data to construct averages for some of the measures of bank risk that are 
widely used in the existing empirical literature and show their evolution over time. The first issue is to 
build a representative dataset. Since the recent crisis originated in the USA, focusing on the US banking 
sector is a natural choice for a contemporary case study of bank risk. A second issue is the availability of 
data. The idea here is to develop a new metric for bank risk without posing more stringent data 
requirements compared to the usual empirical research paper. A quick look in the literature will reveal 
that the great majority of the empirical papers in this field use either quarterly or annual data. The most 
widely used database for studies of the US banking system is the one from the FDIC Call reports.  
We build an unbalanced dataset that includes information for commercial banks over the period 
1985q1-2010q2. We start from the complete sample of banks in the Call reports, but we apply two 
selection criteria. First, we delete all observations for which data on any of the variables used in our study 
are missing. Second, we apply an outlier rule to the variables used, corresponding to the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of the distributions of the respective variables. This deletes extreme values that may drive the 
results. The final sample consists of 814,253 bank-quarter observations.  
On the basis of this sample, we construct five indicators of bank risk following the discussion in 
Section 2.1. In particular, we construct (i) the ratio of equity capital to total assets (capitalization), the 
ratios of (ii) risk-weighted assets to total assets, (iii) loan loss provisions to total loans and (iv) non-
performing loans to total loans (credit risk ratios), and (v) the Z-score (risk of default). Further, we 
construct a market-based indicator of bank risk using CDS data (obtained from the Markit database). For 
these data we calculate quarterly averages over the period 2001q1-2010q2 for which 3-year CDS rates are 
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available.2 We report descriptive statistics for the variables in Table 1. Averaging these indices over all 
banks in the sample on a quarterly basis yields the scores plotted in Figure 1. We name these “averages by 
bank” and illustrate them by a dashed line. On each graph, we also include the time path of what we refer 
to as “industry averages”. For this, we calculate the ratio of total industry equity at quarter t to total 
industry assets at quarter t. We carry out the same calculations for all five ratios. All averages display 
some in-year volatility due to seasonality of the data that is owing to banks’ accounting practices.3 
Evidently, the time paths of averages by bank compared to that of industry averages display some 
differences, which in some cases are quite significant. Note that empirical studies of the banking industry 
that employ panel data use bank-level ratios, which are equivalent to our definition of averages by bank, 
while most of the industry reports use industry averages. Finally, we plot the quarterly average of the 
CDS rate on Figure 1f. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
The bank average of the capital ratio (Figure 1a) shows that equity capital was rising until 2007q3 
and only slightly declines up until 2009q4. The increasing trend up to 2007 is due to the higher 
accumulated wealth of banks in that period and the compliance with Basel capital requirements. Note, 
however, that the financial crisis erupted in 2007 and, evidently, the capital ratio shows no forecasting 
ability. This is quite expected because capital erodes only after problems strike, as banks use capital to 
cover part of their losses. In addition, the decrease in the value of the ratio between 2007q3 and 2009q4 is 
only 0.008, which is very small in absolute terms compared to the impact the crisis had on the banking 
sector. The time path of the industry average is similar, except from the period before and after the crisis 
of 2007-2008. The industry capital ratio peaks at 2005; it starts declining until 2009; and reaches new 
                                               
2 3-year CDS rates are available for a number of large US banks. We choose the 3-year rates because it has the 
largest number of available observations. The quarterly averages of these rates are matched to the full sample of US 
banks using the so-called cusip number of banks. 
3 Given the fact that the relevant literature has not agreed on a unified measure to remove seasonality from 
accounting data, we continue with the raw data throughout the rest of the paper. Accounting for seasonality by a 
simple regression of the accounting measures on a constant and three quarter dummies indeed smooths out the 
series. However, our main findings remain practically the same. 
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high levels in 2010. This pattern suggests that regulatory compliance and possible capital arbitrage by 
banks drives the level of capital. In any case, the capital ratio is not informative about bank risk. 
Figure 1b shows the equivalent trend in the risk-weighted assets ratio, which is the ratio used by 
regulators under the impact of Basel guidelines. This ratio is more informative about the adverse 
developments in 2007 and 2008, while the average by bank and industry average reflect a very similar 
pattern. The trend of the value of the risky-assets ratio is increasing from 1986q4 to 2007q3 (with a short 
break between 2001 and 2003) and drops sharply between 2008 and 2010. This shows that banks up to 
2007q3 were increasingly using part of their liquid assets to take on more risky projects. However, the 
risky-assets ratio also has a number of interrelated shortcomings as a measure of risk. The most important 
of these shortcomings are that (i) risky assets are regulated and this provides banks with incentives to 
underwrite these assets so as not to exceed the given threshold, and (ii) this ratio does not capture the 
perceived buildup of risk that led to the financial crisis in 2007.   
The loan-loss provisions ratio (Figure 1c) decreases from an average value above 0.018 in 
1993q1 to an average value of 0.013 in 1997q3. The ratio returns to a value of approximately 0.018 as of 
2010q2. Both this ratio and the risky-assets one show that banks on average were feeling quite safe until 
well into 2007, taking on extra credit risk and lowering the level of their provisions. Still, the trends in 
both these measures incorporate or lack all the elements discussed in section 2.1. For example, the 
increasing trend in the value of the risky-assets ratio might reflect the enhancement of risk-management 
techniques, while lower values of the provisions ratio might reflect the favorable macroeconomic 
conditions. Moreover, the fluctuation of the industry average loan-loss provisions is quite immense 
compared to the bank-level average, which would render results of regressions with the bank-based 
measure suspect.  
The average by bank of a ratio that seems to completely fail to illustrate the developments in the 
US banking sector during the late 2000s is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Notably, this 
ratio is one of the most commonly employed measures of credit risk in the banking literature. The value 
of this ratio steadily declines up until 2006q4 and the increase that starts in 2007q1 is not large at all to 
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reflect the depth of the crisis in the banking sector. In contrast, the industry average reflects a completely 
different picture, with a sharp rise in non-performing loans starting from 2007q1. We feel that this shows 
that using a bank-level variable on non-performing loans in bank panel data regression analyses is highly 
problematic, as this variable greatly underestimates fluctuations in credit risk. 
Figure 1e shows the evolution of the average Z-score. Here σ(ROA) at quarter t is calculated 
using information on ROA from the past 12 quarters. The Z-score is fairly stable in the period 2004-2006 
and then falls in 2007 and 2008. The fall in 2007 is relatively large and this shows that the Z-score 
actually captures the problems of the banking sector in 2007, making this index probably the best among 
the ones examined previously (at least as far as the stylized facts comply with the crisis). However, the 
problems discussed above, especially the ones about limited forecasting ability of increasing risk in the 
period prior to 2007 and the endogeneity of bank risk, remain. 
The final graph (Figure 1f) shows the evolution of the average 3-year CDS rate for large rated US 
banks over the period 2001q1-2010q2. The picture is very similar to the equivalent for the loan loss 
provisions and problem loans variables. The CDS rates are very low until 2007, showing no ability to 
capture the building up of bank risk after 2001. From 2007 onward the rates increase sharply to reach 
their peak in the first quarter of 2009. Subsequently they decline sharply. As with the two credit risk 
variables, the problem with this indicator is that it shows no forecasting ability. Further, this and in fact 
other market measures of bank risk, are only available for a limited number of large institutions. This can 
be a problem in studies examining issues on regional banking, small enterprise lending, etc.  
In a nutshell, the theoretical considerations and descriptive statistics presented in this section 
highlight the need for a new indicator of bank risk for at least three interrelated reasons. First, simple 
accounting ratios do not incorporate expectations concerning the perceived probability of insolvency. 
Second, most risk ratios usually employed by the relevant literature seem to underestimate risk when 
calculated at the bank-level, especially during periods of immense fluctuations, and many of them cannot 
capture the perceived increase in risk that led to the banking crisis in 2007. Third, and perhaps related to 
the first two limitations, the risk metrics reviewed above do not incorporate elements of endogeneity of 
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risk. The next section proposes a new method to estimate the risk of financial intermediaries that accounts 
for these shortcomings. 
 
3. A new measure of bank risk     
A quite important problem faced by the empirical researcher in estimating technology functions of 
financial intermediaries is that risk should be endogenously determined. The banking theory behind this 
issue is straightforward. The level of risk is set by bank managers in a way that encompasses information 
about the level of expected profits, the level of capital and liquidity that banks hold and the state of the 
structural and macroeconomic environment. Therefore, one cannot suggest that risk determines stricto 
sensu current bank profits. In fact, the perceived optimal level of bank risk is simultaneously determined 
with current profits, also taking into account other endogenous and predetermined variables. This 
modeling choice is absent in the empirical literature, even though it seems fundamental for the robust 
estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries.  
Here, we present a model that uses the profit function to estimate endogenous bank profits. We 
model a representative bank, but this model may in fact be applied in its general form to any firm.4 Bank 
risk depends on certain endogenous variables and it is itself considered to be endogenous in the profit 
function. The rest of the endogenous variables are determined in the context of a simultaneous equation 
model, and also depend on profits as well as risk. Therefore, the model is very general, as it considers all 
potential types of endogeneity. 
We consider a restricted normalized profit function of the form: 
1 1 2i i i i iy x z v      , for 1,...,i N ,       (1) 
where iy  represents profit of bank i, 1ix  is a standard 1 1k   vector of covariates in the profit function, iz  
is a 1G  vector of endogenous variables,  ~ 0,1
iid
iv N  is the error term, and 
2
i  is the variance of 
                                               
4 Of course, this holds given the alterations that should be made to reflect the special features of the industry 
considered. 
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profits to be estimated. Following the portfolio selection theory, we consider the estimates of profit 
variability σ as a formal measure of risk.5  
Assume the following additional specification for the variance of the profit function: 
2 ( , ),i if z            (2) 
where iz  is a 1G  vector of variables that determines the risk of banks,   is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated and ( , )if z   is a functional form differentiable in iz . For example, f can take the form 
2
i iz   or 
2 exp( )i iz  , etc. Note that, despite the fact that we use a “cross-sectional notation”, 
panel data models of the form  2 2 2, 1 ,, ,..., ;it it i t i t Lf z      are fully nested within our general 
specification in Eq. (2). This also includes the formal possibility of incorporating fixed effects in (1) and 
(2). The dependence on bank profits iy  will be discussed below. 
Up to this stage, we formally identify risk with the variability of profits and explain this 
variability in terms of a vector of variables included in iz . If these variables were predetermined or 
exogenous, estimation of the profit function in (1) subject to (2) would be straightforward using the 
method of maximum likelihood. Unfortunately, this is a very strong assumption for financial institutions’ 
risk-setting behavior, since the iz s represent firm (bank) characteristics that are simultaneously 
determined with the level of risk in the following way: 
2
2( , , )i i i iz f x y  ,         (3) 
where 2ix  is a 2 1k   vector of explanatory variables of z, which can include 1ix . For example, bank 
managers set the optimal level of risk given the levels of capitalization, liquidity, etc, which are naturally 
included in z. This simultaneity of the iz s with bank risk is a notorious element in the banking literature 
and should be accounted for in any attempt to estimate risk robustly. Further, risk and other characteristics 
of bank balance sheets are heavily affected by the regulatory or macroeconomic conditions prevailing at 
                                               
5 Of course, after estimation one could consider only the downside variance of profits as a measure of bank risk. 
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each point in time. Therefore, these elements might also have to be included in z. Thorough discussions of 
these issues can be found in the literature cited in footnote 1. 
To account for this endogeneity, assume the following general simultaneous equation model: 
   22 1 1 2 2i i i i iz x y u          ,  ~ 0,
iid
iu N  ,                          (4) 
Here, 1  and 2  are known univariate differentiable functions (for example  j w w   or 
  logj w w  , 1, 2j  ), 1 , 2  are 1G  vectors of coefficients, and   and   are G G  and 
2G k , respectively. Of course, restrictions are assumed in place for   and   in view of identification. 
For example, the diagonal elements of   are assumed to be equal to 1 and this matrix must be 
nonsingular. Moreover, the variance 2i  may depend also on 2ix . Further, the variance may also depend 
on yi. The Jacobian of transformation from vi to yi can be formally computed and this possibility has been 
recognized before by Rigobon (2003). This is very important, because the researcher does not need to 
identify a set of instrumental variables that are not correlated with vi; the xi1 and xi2 themselves are valid 
instruments. 
  For simplicity, we can write    2 * *2 1 1 2 2 2i i i i i i iz x y u x u             . To begin with, 
we assume  1 2 10 G    . Then 
     
2
1/ 2 1 1 22
2
| 2 exp
2
i i i
i i i
i
y x z
p y z
 


    
  
  
     (5) 
and 
       / 2 1/ 2 * * 1 * *1 2 222 exp
G
i i i i ip z z x z x
            
 
   (6) 
Therefore, the joint distribution of the observed endogenous variables is 
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
 
  
 
 
 
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 
  
  

     
  (7) 
This likelihood function can be maximized using standard numerical techniques. Formal concentration 
with respect to parameters *  and   is also possible, so the problem can be simplified in terms of 
maximizing the log-likelihood function of the sample.6 
In the general case, where 1 2, 0   , the formulation of  |i ip y z  is straightforward, but the 
formulation of the inverse distribution  |i ip z y  or  ip z  is not trivial. The Jacobian of transformation 
is given by  
 
 
 
 / 2
2 2 1 1 2
, ;
;
,
Gi i i
i i
i i i
v u f z
D f z
y z z

     
 
      
 
,                            (8) 
after accounting for the fact that the variance depends itself on endogenous variables (the iz s). If 
2
i iz  , then 
 ;i
i
f z
z





. If  2 expi iz  , then 
 
 
;
expi i
i
f z
z
z

 

 

.  
In this case, we have 
     
 
 
     
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( 1) / 2 / 2 1 1
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 
 
 

    
  
 
   
  
 
 
                  

  (9) 
The simplest case is when    1 2w w w   ,
7 and  ;i if z z  . In this case the Jacobian 
term is simply 2 1 2      , where 2    and 1 2   are rank-one G G  matrices. Of course, if 1  or 
                                               
6 The details are available on request from the authors. 
7 One may think that specifying φ2(w) = log(w) is better, since variances are restricted to being positive. This is, of 
course, correct. However, a large part of the literature on GARCH models simply ignores this constraint and adopts 
the assumption φ2(w) = w, using parametric restrictions (on γ) to ensure positive variances.  
 18
2  (or possibly both) are zero, further simplifications arise. The typical case is to have profits, iy , and 
the variance, 2i , appearing as determinants of the iz s. Part of the reason may be that not all banks have 
positive profits, so that we cannot consider the log of iy . However, one may have  2 logw w  , with 
  12 w w
  . In that case, the Jacobian would be 
  
 1
2 1 2
;
; i
i
i i
f
z
z
D f z

   
 

    .                                               (10) 
In terms of our model, it is instructive to provide a simple example to show that risk can also be a 
function of profits ( iy ). Indeed, consider for simplicity the following “mean-scale” model 
 i i iy y v   , where  ~ 0,1
iid
iv N . Apparently, the Jacobian of transformation is 
 
    
 
2
y y yv
y y
  

 


        (11) 
and the density of y would be 
   
 
 
    
 
2
1/ 2
2 2
2 exp
2
y y y y
p y
y y
   

 

    
   
  
.    (12) 
The Jacobian is nonzero, provided  y  is not a solution of the difference equation 
     0y y y     , that is  
2
y  should not be equal to  
2
C y  , where C is a constant. 
Other specifications for the variance term would be acceptable, for example    
2 2
1 2y C C y    , 
1 0C  . This shows that, in terms of our model, risk can be a function of profits ( iy ) themselves, despite 
the fact that profits are also determined by risk. In that sense, we allow for joint determination of risk and 
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profits.8 Suppose, indeed, that 2i i iz y    . Then, relative to (8), the only difference is that the 
Jacobian term is  2 2 1 1 2 2 2               . If 2 0  , the new formulation does not add anything 
to the Jacobian, otherwise, the contribution depends on 
 , ;i i
i
f z y
y





. 
 The above describes the equivalent to GARCH-type process for the variance, which is probably 
enough for practical purposes. In case one wants to extent this case to the stochastic risk or stochastic 
volatility of the profit function, we provide the analytics in the Appendix. Here we move on to the 
estimation of the model provided above using data from the US banking sector.  
  
4. Empirical application to the US banking sector 
4.1. Empirical setup 
Following the paradigm of Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Koetter et al. (2011) and many others, we use an 
alternative profit function that models profits as a function of outputs and input prices. The alternative 
profit function is suitable to measure the extent to which a bank generates maximum profits given its 
output levels. We provide formal definitions for the variables used to estimate the profit function in Table 
2 and summary statistics in Table 3. To define outputs and input prices we follow the intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Koetter et al., 2011). Under this approach, a bank's production 
function uses labor and physical capital to attract deposits. The deposits are used to fund loans and other 
earning assets. Therefore, various categories of loans and other earning assets serve as bank outputs, 
while relevant ratios of salary expenses, interest expenses and expenses on fixed assets serve as input 
prices. In essence, our approach considers the measurement of on-balance sheet risk. One could also 
include a disaggregation of securities and non-interest income or off-balance sheet items as outputs. This 
would reduce the time frame of the analysis from 1997 onwards, because data on these items are not 
                                               
8 This is different from a GARCH-M type model, where the lagged variance, typically, enters into the mean 
equation. Here, the current variance can also enter the mean equation, provided that a proper adjustment for the 
Jacobian term is made. This point seems to be unpublished, at least, to our knowledge.  
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available before 1997. Changes in average values of estimated risk are not larger than 5%, thus, we 
choose to use the full sample period as benchmark.  
[INSERT TABLES 2 & 3] 
Given the above, we rewrite Eqs. (1) to (3), as:  
5 2 2
0
1 1 1
i k i l i m i i iy out z w v                   (13) 
2 ( , )i if z            (14) 
2
2( , , )i i i iz f x y  .         (15) 
Eq. (13) is the general form of the alternative profit function to be estimated and Eqs. (14) and (15) are 
the equivalent ones of Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively. In this system of equations, y is profits before tax, 
out represents the five bank outputs listed in Table 2, z, σ and xi2 are as above, and w represents the three 
input prices defined in Table 2. All variables are in logs.  
We estimate the system of Eqs. (13) to (15), using the full-information maximum likelihood 
method proposed above. We experiment with both a log-linear and a translog specification for the profit 
function. Further, we impose linear homogeneity by dividing profits and input prices by w3. As profits 
contain both positive and negative values, taking logs of profits becomes an issue. We, primarily, use the 
approach of Bos and Koetter (2011). Under this approach, we impose y = 1 for all y < 0 and construct a 
negative profit indicator variable, say y1 = |y|, which we use as an additional right-hand side variable. 
Following relevant literature, we check the sensitivity of our results by (i) using only positive profits and 
(ii) adding up the maximum negative profits observed in our sample to all banks plus 1 (to make an index 
of only positive profits) and (iii) using a non-log specification. We report the results from the method of 
Bos and Koetter (2011) and the rest are available on request. 
As discussed above, we assume that the variance of profits (risk) is endogenous to profits 
themselves and other bank or industry characteristics. Bank characteristics endogenous to σ, i.e. those 
used as z, are the basic equity capital ratio (total equity capital to total assets, denoted as z1) and/ or a 
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liquidity ratio (liquid assets to total assets, denoted as z2). Therefore, we assume that banks make risky 
decisions simultaneously with the levels of capitalization and/ or liquidity in their balance sheets. 
Consider, for example, two banks with the same initial risk levels, but different levels of capitalization or 
liquidity. Now if there is a systemic event in the banking sector, the more liquid or capitalized bank will 
be able to buffer the risk associated with this event more easily, while the less liquid or less-capitalized 
bank will have to re-determine its risky position to a greater extent. Naturally, in the following period the 
level of risk (i.e., the volatility of profits) of the two banks will be quite different. The same will happen if 
the change in risk comes from a change in operational risk (e.g., an internal organizational event). Many 
other similar arguments can be found in Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Degryse et al. (2009).9  
We identify z in Eq. (15) using a number of variables x2. As discussed in Section 3, these 
variables can also determine the variance of profits or profits themselves in Eqs. (13) and (14), 
respectively. This implies that they do not have to be uncorrelated with the error term of Eq. (13). We 
name these variables “identifiers”. We run many alternative specifications, but we resort to the inclusion 
of the fourth lags of bank size and efficiency that are observed at the bank-level, as well as the first lags of 
the three month T-bill rate and the industrial production index as macroeconomic determinants of bank 
risk. Concerning the bank-level identifiers the inclusion of bank size and efficiency is a reasonable 
assumption in the literature of the determinants of bank capital and liquidity (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 
2008; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). In particular, larger and more efficient banks are usually more closely 
followed by market investors. Thus, these banks may have better access to wholesale liabilities, loan sale 
markets, liquid assets and so forth. With better access to these liquidity sources, larger banks may 
therefore require to hold less capital and liquidity. Alternatively, larger banks have more complex balance 
sheets and are more closely regulated. Thus, these banks might be optimally financed with a larger 
proportion of equity capital or might need a higher portion of liquid assets to meet unexpected demand. 
The two bank-level identifiers, denoted as ide1 and ide2, are lagged four times, as we assume that bank 
                                               
9 One can in fact assume that the volatility of bank profits is endogenous to a number of other bank characteristics. 
Here we restrict our analysis to bank capital and liquidity, which are the two most important characteristics of banks 
differentiating bank behavior in a wide array of studies (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jimenez et al., 2009).   
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managers shape their capital and liquidity levels based on information on their size and efficiency in the 
previous year.10 
The two macroeconomic variables, denoted ide3 and ide4, enter Eq. (3) lagged once (values of 
the previous quarter) to allow information to reach the market. By including these variables we capture 
the fact that bank managers shape their risky behavior by observing, inter alia, the state of the 
macroeconomic environment. One can very easily experiment with many other variables common to all 
banks to be included in Eq. (15) and examine the sensitivity of the results. We experiment with some 
regulatory dummies, characterizing major regulatory events, with institutional variables, etc. The results 
are unaffected and, as our main effort here is to estimate risk and not analyze an exhaustive list of its 
determinants, we decided to keep the empirical framework as simple as possible. 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
Table 4 reports estimation results for the main variables of interest that help identifying Eqs. (14) and 
(15), namely z1, z2 and ide1 to ide4. Reporting all estimated coefficients is impractical, as the number of 
estimated parameters for both the basic log-linear and the translog models is quite high. The results on the 
rest of the parameters are available on request. We report the results for four specifications. The first two 
are log-linear specifications and the last two are translog specifications. All variables are statistically 
significant and bear the expected sign. In particular, banks with higher levels of capital and liquid assets 
(higher z1 and z2, respectively) take on higher risk in the next period. This is intuitive because most 
banks tend to mitigate the effects of the increase in capital levels by increasing asset-risk posture, while 
banks holding a high level of liquid assets tend to use excess liquidity to take on higher risks in the next 
period.11  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
                                               
10 We use the values in the previous year and not the ones in the previous quarter to treat problems arising from the 
seasonality of bank-level data (see also Delis et al., 2011). 
11 For a thorough analysis on the potential positive relationship between risk and capital, see Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992). 
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The results of main interest are those on the variance of the profit function, which in our model 
represents individual bank risk. In Figures 2a to 2d, we plot the quarterly average of the bank-quarter 
values of risk (log of variance) obtained from the four specifications separately and in Figure 3 we place 
them together for comparative purposes. Irrespective of the functional form used, or whether we specify 
z1 or z2 as endogenous, bank risk was fairly stable until 2001 and increased more than 200% thereafter. 
This pattern is robust to the inclusion of equity capital or a time trend also in Eq. (1), and alternative 
determinants of z1 or z2 in Eq. (3). Therefore, all models capture the perceived increase in bank risk that 
took place in the period following the attack on the World Trade Center and prior to 2007.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
Specifically, a number of recent studies suggest that certain exogenous shocks, that lead to lower 
informational asymmetries, trigger intensified competition and credit expansion, and create incentives for 
banks to search for higher yield in more risky projects. Rajan (2006) goes on to state explicitly that the 
source of such bank behavior could be an environment of low interest rates and Delis et al. (2011) 
confirm this theoretical argument using a similar dataset to the one of the present study. Other scholars 
(e.g., Stiglitz, 2009) argue that increasing bank risk prior to 2007 is largely attributed to increased 
political pressure to finance the economy in general and the housing market in particular, and to 
consumers’ choices to lower the widening income inequality of the time. Our new measure of bank risk 
largely confirms these perceptions. 
In fact, we identify only two different patterns of risk through time among the four alternative 
specifications. The first, which is quantitatively less important, comes from the specification with 
liquidity as z (line 2 on Figure 3) instead of equity capital (line 1). The specification with liquidity shows 
that risk reached a maximum as soon as in early 2005 and remained at very high levels until the end of 
our sample period. In contrast, line 1 shows that risk was increasing up until 2009. If we add both z1 and 
z2 into the same model, the results are very close to those reflected by line 2. Also, the specification with 
z2 shows a higher value of risk. This pattern is explained by the presence of capital requirements in the 
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US banking sector as early as 1989. The capital requirement does not allow bank capital to fluctuate as 
much as liquidity, which is subject to only limited regulation. Therefore, bank liquidity is, probably, the 
most important factor in determining bank risk and is the one used in the rest of the specifications 
reported in Table 4.12 
The second difference comes from using a translog specification, as opposed to a log-linear one. 
The flexibility of the translog profit function captures a decline in the variability of profits after the 
eruption of the crisis in 2007 (see lines 3 and 4). This looks sensible, as banks started lowering their 
exposure to very risky assets, as soon as they could after the eruption of the crisis, while prudential 
regulation became tighter with an increased number of inspection audits and sanctions. However, we 
should note that risk remains quite high, compared to the period before 2001. Given the above evidence, 
we favor the translog specification.  
We also estimate a simple model, where the variance is not endogenous to any variables. This is 
equivalent to the estimation of Eq. (13) alone and the derivation of the variance of profits therefrom. We 
average the estimates of the variance across quarters and we plot them in Figure 2e. This specification 
does capture an increase in bank risk after 2001 and a decrease in 2007. Yet, the time pattern of this line 
is quite different, showing a large increase in 1992. Not incidentally, Basel I was enacted in 1992, which 
shows the very special role of considering endogenous variables like capital and liquidity when estimating 
bank risk. Also, similar to the accounting-based measures, the index reflects some seasonality, which is 
not smoothed out by endogenous decisions of bank managers. Thus, the model where risk is not 
endogenous to bank characteristics is systematically different and largely fails to capture all elements 
explaining the level of bank risk.  
Overall, the value of the new method proves quite significant if one compares the results from the 
proposed method with the indices of bank risk shown in Figure 1. As we discuss in Section 2, these 
measures fail to consider the endogeneity of bank risk to other bank characteristics and do not capture the 
                                               
12 An alternative would be to use the distance of equity capital from the minimum requirement. When doing so, the 
results are, indeed, closer to those with the use of the liquidity ratio.  
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increase in bank risk or the extent of this increase after 2001 and before 2007. Further, in Table 5 we 
report simple correlation coefficients between the values of the four newly constructed indices (Risk1 to 
Risk4) and the five existing indices (Risk-weighted assets, loan-loss provisions, problem loans, Z-index 
and CDS rates). Evidently, correlation coefficients between the newly constructed indices and the existing 
ones are very low. This is especially true for our preferred measures of risk that come from the translog 
specification. We attribute the limitations of existing indices (i) to the fact that they do not follow 
standard economic theory (with the exception of the Z-index), (ii) to the fact that they reflect a static 
picture of accounting data and (iii) to their inability to account for the endogeneity/ simultaneity issue 
discussed in this paper.  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 A final, yet important, exercise comes from examining the behavior of banks that at some point 
during our full sample period became insolvent. Intuitively, the risk of these banks prior to their default 
should be considerably higher than the industry’s average, so that our measure can also be interpreted as 
“risk of default”. In Figure 4 we plot the risk of the banks that subsequently became insolvent (and thus 
stopped operating or were acquainted by other banks) during the full sample period. Information for the 
insolvent banks is obtained from the FDIC and the data are matched using the certification number. The 
risk metric used for the failed banks to obtain their average risk by quarter is the one from the estimation 
of Eq. (3) of Table 4. The results are as expected, invalidating our measure of risk as a good proxy for the 
risk of default. In particular, the risk of banks that became insolvent is considerably higher than the 
average bank in the industry. The abrupt spikes in the risk of failed banks are due to the seasonality in the 
data, but the considerable extent of the seasonality might reflect the effort of these banks to mask their 
high risk levels. An interesting finding is that the risk of the failed banks peaks in the period 2005-2007, 
which is before the official eruption of the crisis and decreases in 2008-2009 when problematic banks 
actually failed. Clearly, this provides considerable evidence that our risk measure is a leading indicator 
that provides early-warning signals for bank problems. In a similar context, a rather worrying 
development is that the risk of insolvency seems to increase again by the end of our sample period (in the 
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first two quarters of 2010). Notably, FDIC data suggests that 294 more banks failed between 2010q1 and 
2012q3.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study proposes a new method for the estimation of the risk of financial institutions, which is very 
general and can be applied to any firm. Two important and interrelated features of the model are that it is 
based on standard economic and banking theory and that risk is endogenously determined with certain 
characteristics of the intermediary and with the macroeconomic environment. The model proposes the 
derivation of bank risk using the variance of the profit function. The profit function is estimated 
simultaneously with a function of determinants of the variance of profits. In turn, these determinants are 
also endogenous to the variance of profits and potentially to other bank and industry characteristics, 
making all the variables characterizing banking fundamentals, which appear in the estimated system of 
equations, endogenous. Therefore, the model overcomes the notorious difficulties stemming from the fact 
that risky decisions of banks are made endogenous to other bank and industry fundamentals.   
We apply this method to the full sample of US commercial banks over the period 1985q1-
2010q2. The new measure captures the perceived increase of bank risk in the US banking sector after 
2001 and shows that this increase was gradual over the period 2001-2007 and very strong. More 
specifically, the results of the new method show that bank risk was only mildly increasing from 1985 to 
2001, while since 2001 and up to 2007 the increase is higher than 200%. This finding is in line with the 
perception that since 2001 and prior to the eruption of the financial turmoil of the late 2000s, various 
economic and political forces shaped an environment where banks’ risk-taking increased substantially. 
Thus, our new measure of risk also provides a leading indicator to forecast solvency problems in the 
banking industry. In contrast, most accounting- and market-based ratios that are widely used by 
researchers and policy-makers as measures of bank risk, fail to show this substantial increase in bank risk 
since 2001 and until 2007. This is an important observation of our study that renders the results of 
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previous literature on bank risk, and its determinants, questionable. Further, by matching the risk 
measures obtained from our method with information for the banks that failed, we show that our measure 
is a good proxy for default risk. The fact that default risk for the banks that subsequently failed peaks one 
to two years before the period 2008-2010, when most of the bank failures occurred, also shows that power 
of the new method to forecast problems in the banking sector.  
Besides the banking firm, this model can be applied to any other type of financial intermediary or 
any other non-financial firm, of course with minor modifications pertaining to the special features of each 
industry. Further, the model can be very easily used to calculate downside variance or look at the standard 
deviation of expected profits in a fashion similar to the Sharpe ratio. We leave these ideas for future 
research. 
 
Appendix A. The case of stochastic risk 
A process for the variance as proposed in Section 3 is, perhaps, enough for practical purposes. However, 
one may want to explore the implications of stochastic risk or stochastic volatility for the profit function. 
Suppose we have a stochastic risk process of the form 
2log i i iz    , where the new error term is 
 2~ 0,
iid
i N   . Here, we explicitly assume log ( , )i if z z   . The full model can now be written as 
follows: 
1 1 2i i i i iy x z v      , 
   22 1 1 2 2i i i i iz x y u          ,      (A1) 
2log i i iz    . 
In that form, we can formally consider volatility, 2log i , as an endogenous (but latent) variable. 
Therefore, 
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After computing the Jacobian term, the joint distribution is the following: 
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(A3) 
where  1 1 1 2i i i i ie y x z  
     . The simplest case is to have 2 1  , so that the Jacobian is 
independent of 2i . But still the density of the observables is  
   2 2, , , logi i i i i ip y z p y z d   ,       (A4) 
which cannot be computed analytically. For details, see the literature on stochastic volatility. Of course, if 
2 1  , the integral is even more complicated and standard simulation techniques proposed in the 
aforementioned literature need considerable modification. A relatively simple case is when 1 2 0   . 
In fact, the critical issue is whether 2 0  . If not, then stochastic risk appears in the Jacobian terms of 
the sample likelihood and formal or numerical integration is troublesome.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of variables commonly used as measures of 
bank risk 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Capitalization 0.096 0.030 0.032 0.460 
Risky assets 0.636 0.053 0.294 0.698 
Loan-loss provisions 0.016 0.009 0.002 0.064 
Problem loans 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.053 
Z-score 13.596 5.259 -0.327 71.302 
CDS rate (3-year) 201.53 757.82 2.488 45,492.5 
Notes: The variables are defined as follows. Capitalization is equity capital/ 
total assets. Risk assets is risk-weighted assets/ total assets. Loan-loss 
provisions is provisions for loan losses/ total loans. Problem loans is non-
performing loans (90 days and over)/ total loans. Z-score is 
(ROA+EA)/σ(ROA), where ROA is profits before tax/ total assets, EA is 
capitalization and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over a period of 
3 years (12 quarters). The CDS rate is the 3-year CDS rate for which 
summary statistics are calculated over the period 2001q1-2010q2 for which 
these rates are available.  
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Table 2  
Definitions of variables  
Variable Symbol  Measure 
Bank profits y Total profits before tax ($US) 
Output 1  out1 Commercial and industrial loans ($US) 
Output 2  out2 Loans to individuals ($US) 
Output 3 out3 Loans secured by real estate ($US) 
Output 4 out4 Other loans ($US) 
Output 5 out5 Other earning assets ($US) 
Input price 1 w1 Salary expenses/ total assets 
Input price 2 w2 Interest expenses/ total deposits 
Input price 3 w3 Expenses on fixed assets/total fixed assets 
Capitalization z1 Equity capital/ total assets 
Liquidity z2 Liquid assets/ total assets 
Bank size ide1 Bank size: natural logarithm of total assets 
Efficiency ide2 Bank efficiency: total income/ total cost 
Interest rate ide3 3-month T-bill rate (in %) 
Industrial production ide4 US industrial production index 
Notes: Variables y, out1, out2, out3, out4 and ide1 are in real terms. 
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Table 3  
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
y 5,395.9 121,227.6 -1.81e+07 2.30e+07 
out1 70,340.8 1,143,058 1 1.42e+08 
out2 42,828.3 761,145.9 1 9.43e+07 
out3 178,448.6 3,168,042 1 4.75e+08 
out4 33,906.3 798,096.5 1 8.88e+07 
out5 276,058.4 6,714,982 1 1.07e+09 
w1 0.0099 0.0053 0.0017 0.0325 
w2 0.0248 0.0147 0.0028 0.0733 
w3 0.0027 0.0018 0.0002 0.0119 
z1 0.0960 0.0298 0.0321 0.4600 
z2 0.9410 0.0446 0.5945 0.9978 
ide1 11.289 1.298 8.501 21.293 
ide2 0.0084 0.0071 -0.0356 0.0312 
ide3 4.543 2.058 0.070 8.533 
ide4 75.525 14.622 54.706 100.44 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table 2. y, out1, out2, out3, 
out4 and out5 are in $US. Number of observations equals 
814,253 for all variables.  
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Table 4 
Estimation results on the main determinants of risk 
Equation: (1) 
Risk endogenous 
to z1 
(2) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
(3) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
(4) 
Risk endogenous 
to z2 
Functional form: Log-linear Log-linear Translog Translog 
Eq. (14)     
z1 0.273***    
 (22.16)    
z2  0.379*** 0.278*** 0.255*** 
  (61.15) (59.33) (48.89) 
Eq. (15)     
fourth lag of ide1 -0.036*** -0.116*** -0.189*** -0.151*** 
 (-15.98) (-51.15) (-74.95) (-55.27) 
fourth lag of ide2 0.042* -0.021** -0.026** -0.024** 
 (1.78) (-2.42) (-2.29) (-2.24) 
first lag of ide3    -0.121*** 
    (-46.30) 
first lag of ide4    -0.172*** 
    (-43.70) 
Notes: The table reports estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics) for Equations (14) and (15) 
obtained from the joint estimation of Equations (13-15), using maximum likelihood. We use 814,253 
bank-quarter observations, covering the period 1985q1-2010q2. Variables are defined in Table 2. In 
all regressions, risk is endogenous to profits and to z1 or z2 as specified on the top of the table. In 
specifications (1) to (3) the endogenous variables z1 or z2 are identified using the fourth lags of ide1 
and ide2. In specification (4) the first lags of ide3 and ide4 lso identify z2.   
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix between indices of bank risk 
 Risk1 Risk2 Risk3 Risk4 Ris. ass. Z-index Prov. Pr. loans 
Risk1 1.000        
Risk2 0.900 1.000       
Risk3 0.559 0.671 1.000      
Risk4 0.594 0.715 0.993 1.000     
Risky assets 0.031 0.025 0.015 0.017 1.000    
Z-index -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.146 1.000   
Provisions -0.027 -0.021 -0.012 -0.013 -0.070 0.043 1.000  
Problem loans -0.054 -0.041 -0.026 -0.028 -0.095 -0.061 0.098 1.000 
CDS rate 0.247 0.238 -0.006 0.025 -0.110 0.244 0.262 0.208 
Notes: The table presents simple correlation coefficients between the four indices of bank risk constructed 
using the equivalent specifications of Table 4 (denoted as Risk1 to Risk4) and the bank level values of the 
indices of bank risk shown in Figures 1a-1e and defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of various bank risk indices over the period 1985q1-2010q2 
 
  (a) Capitalization (total equity/total assets)                   (b) Risky assets (risk-weighted assets/total assets)  
     
 
(c) Credit risk (loan loss provisions/total loans)           (d) Credit risk (problem loans/total loans) 
      
 
(e) z-score (ROA+EA)/σ(ROA)           (f) CDS rate (3-year) 
      
 
Notes: For graph (a) the industry average is calculated as (total industry equity at quarter t)/(total industry assets at 
quarter t). Average by bank is calculated as the average of (total equity of bank i at quarter t)/ (total assets of bank i 
at quarter t). The same definition of industry vs. bank average applies to all other graphs, except from the CDS rate, 
which is calculated as the industry average across banks by quarter. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of bank risk (log of variance) over the period 1985q1-2010q2 
 
(a) Risk endogenous to z1 (log-linear model)  (b) Risk endogenous to z2 (log-linear model)  
  
 
(c) Risk endogenous to z2 (translog model)   (d) Risk endogenous to z2 (translog model)   
  
 
(e) Estimation without z 
  
 
Notes: The figures present the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk as obtained from the 
specifications (1) to (4) presented in Table 4 and the specification without any variables z. 
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Figure 3 
Evolution of bank risk (log of variance) over the period 1985q1-2010q2 
 
 
Notes: The figure presents the quarterly average of the bank-quarter values of risk as obtained from the specifications (1)-(4) presented in Table 4. 
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Figure 4 
Evolution of bank risk for banks that failed from 2007 onward 
 
 
